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Ireland’s Public Debt – 
Tell Me a Story We Have Not Heard Yet …
Seamus Coﬀ ey
Seamus is a college lecturer in Economics at University College Cork and a columnist 
with the Irish Independent. He blogs at http://economic-incentives.blogspot.com/
There has been an ongoing, and at times confusing, debate about 
what Ireland’s public debt will be in 2015. This chapter aims to 
look at some of the different elements of Irish public debt and the 
factors that can pull us away from the precipice of a sovereign 
default. This would be relatively straightforward if there was a 
universally accepted defi nition of public debt; there is not. 
Economists are at heart storytellers. As storytellers, econo-
mists decide what matters for their purposes; they are, in a word, 
selective. By appreciating economists as storytellers, the general 
public can perhaps appreciate better why economists disagree. 
The spectre of default in Ireland is an exemplar of storytelling 
and how appreciating the choices the economist as storyteller 
makes is crucial in enabling the reader of such stories entering 
into that economist’s imaginative world. So, let me tell you a 
story of default.
As a starting point we will use the general government debt 
(GGD) measure as defi ned in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
This is the measure used by Eurostat when compiling EU data 
and is also commonly used by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and 
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Development (OECD). The GGD is the consolidated gross total 
of all liabilities of general government. 
In the GGD no allowance is made for any assets that may 
offset some of these liabilities. The GGD is simply the total of all 
general government liabilities. The Maastricht Treaty laid out the 
rules for entry and participation in the single currency. One of 
these was that the GGD could not exceed 60 per cent of a coun-
try’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP). At the end of 2011 
only four Eurozone countries satisfi ed this limit: Finland, Luxem-
bourg, Slovakia and Slovenia. All other countries were in excess 
of the 60 per cent limit.
At the end of 2011, Ireland’s GGD was €166 billion. The compo-
sition of this debt is shown in Table 4.1. Although we are still 
awaiting the fi nal fi gure it is likely that 2011 nominal GDP will 
be around €155 billion. This means our debt to GDP ratio is prob-
ably 107 per cent.
Table 4.1: General Government Debt, December 2011
Item Amount
Government bonds €85 billion
Promissory notes €28 billion
Retail debt €14 billion
EU/IMF loans €33 billion
Other €6 billion
TOTAL €166 billion
Source: National Treasury Management Agency
It is also important to note that there was €13 billion of cash in the 
Exchequer Account at the end of 2011 which is not offset when 
determining the GGG.
Just as there is no single defi nition of public debt, there is 
no universally accepted threshold of where this debt becomes 
unsustainable with a default viewed as inevitable. The 60 per 
cent threshold was chosen for the Maastricht Treaty simply 
because this was viewed as a ‘safe’ level of public debt. At the 
time of the introduction of the Euro in 1999, original members 
WID-04.indd   2 14/02/2012   15:25:23
Ireland’s Public Debt – Tell Me a Story We Have Not Heard Yet … 
3
of the Eurozone such as Belgium and Italy already had debt that 
was above 100 per cent of GDP.
Recent studies have shown that a public debt in excess of 80 per 
cent of GDP has a negative effect on economic growth, but this is 
not the same as saying the debt is unsustainable. In a European 
context it is likely that a debt ratio in excess of 120 per cent puts 
a country in grave danger of seeing its debt spiral out of control.
At the end of 2011 the Greek debt ratio was well in excess of 
this level at 160 per cent, with Italy right on threshold at 120 per 
cent. In 2011, Ireland, with a debt of 107 per cent of GDP, was 
below this threshold and while there are some (including me) 
who envisage the debt ratio stabilising and subsequently falling 
away from these levels there are many who see the debt ratio 
breaking through this threshold and continuing to rise. In one 
view default can be avoided; in the other it is inevitable.
To see why the choice of these thresholds is not universal we 
simply have to look at the example of Japan. At the end of 2011, 
the Japanese GGD was 230 per cent of GDP. This is more than 
twice the Irish ratio but there is no one writing books that Japan 
is on the verge of default. At the end of 2011 the yield on ten-year 
Japanese government bonds was less than 1 per cent. Investors in 
Japanese bonds do not think they will default either.
There are a myriad of reasons as to why Japanese debt is sustain-
able at 230 per cent of GDP while default is the only outcome for 
Greece with a debt of 160 per cent of GDP. The key one is that 
the Japanese government controls the Bank of Japan, which can 
simply print more yen to repay their debts. Greece cannot avail of 
anything like this facility with the European Central Bank (ECB).
The debt ratio is a straightforward calculation that puts the 
total debt in the numerator and the level of GDP in the denomi-
nator. Changes in either will bring about changes in the ratio.
Debt
~
Interest Cost & Primary Defi cit
GDP Economic Growth & Infl ation
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In order for the debt to be sustainable it is necessary that the aver-
age interest rate on the debt is less than the sum of the growth 
and infl ation rates unless the government runs a suffi ciently 
large primary surplus. The primary balance is the budget balance 
excluding interest payments. If a country is running a primary 
defi cit and the interest rate is greater than the nominal growth 
rate the debt ratio will rise unsustainably.
At the time of the Budget in December 2011 the Department of 
Finance estimated that nominal growth in 2012 would be 2.3 per 
cent and that there would be a primary defi cit in 2012 of 4.1 per 
cent of GDP. In both cases we miss the debt sustainability crite-
ria. The interest rate on our debt is more than double the growth 
rate and there is no primary surplus to offset this interest cost. In 
2012 the GGD is forecast to rise from 107 per cent to 114 per cent 
of GDP.
Over the coming years the nominal growth rate is forecast to 
rise to around 4 per cent a year, though changes to real growth or 
infl ation will affect this. This will still be below the average inter-
est rate on our debt, which is forecast to be 5.2 per cent in 2015, 
so in the absence of a suffi ciently large primary surplus the debt 
ratio will continue to rise.
The primary balance is forecast to move from a defi cit of 4 per 
cent of GDP in 2012 to a surplus of 3 per cent in 2015. It is this 
improvement in the public fi nances that will stabilise the debt 
ratio. If these conditions are satisfi ed in 2015 the debt will fall 
from 117 per cent to 114 per cent of GDP over the year.
This dynamic was improved considerably by the EU decision 
in July 2011 to reduce the interest rate on loans provided as part 
of the EU/IMF programme. This decision reduced the average 
interest rate on Irish debt by about 1 per cent and substantially 
increased the impact of a primary surplus on the debt ratio. If 
these interest rate reductions were not granted it is unlikely that 
the debt ratio would have been contained.
To see why this debt sustainability story is plausible we are 
going to do two things. First, we will explore how the GGD got 
to €166 billion by 2011; and second, what it will rise to by 2015.
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At the end of 2007, Ireland’s GGD was €47 billion. This is the 
debt level we brought into the crisis, which was largely a result of 
the previous crisis in the public fi nances in the 1980s. In general 
governments do not repay debt, rolling it over instead by borrow-
ing anew. From 2007, the debt then increased by €119 billion in 
just four years.
From 2007 to 2009, the cash balances in the Exchequer and 
other accounts increased from just under €4 billion to almost €17 
billion. During 2008 and 2009 the National Treasury Manage-
ment Agency had the foresight to borrow funds on international 
markets to build up these cash balances before Ireland was shut 
out of the bond markets in late 2010. This increase in our cash 
buffer accounts for about €13 billion of the rise in the government 
debt.
Financing the services provided by government in these four 
years required €59 billion of borrowing. This was necessary to fi ll 
the gap that emerged between government revenue and govern-
ment expenditure and to ensure that the government could meet 
its pay, pensions, social welfare and interest outgoings. Interest 
expenditure over the four years was €13 billion.
Separately, there is the money that has been used for the bail-
out of our delinquent banking system. By the end of 2010, the 
Exchequer had contributed around €9 billion directly to the 
banks. This was evenly split between borrowed money paid into 
the National Pension Reserve Fund since 2007 that was subse-
quently used as part of the initial recapitalisations of AIB and 
Bank of Ireland, and direct contributions from the Exchequer to 
Anglo, Irish National Building Society (INBS) and EBS.
There was also the creation of €31 billion of promissory notes 
given to Anglo, INBS and EBS in 2010. These are a promise by 
the state to pay this money to the banks, but the payment will be 
spread out over an extended period. The fi rst instalment of €3.1 
billion was made in March 2011 and these will continue well into 
the next decade until the full amount, plus accrued interest, is 
paid to these zombie institutions. The fi nal cost of repaying the 
promissory notes has been estimated at €48 billion and if these 
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repayments continue to be made with borrowed money the total 
cost of the promissory notes will exceed €80 billion by 2030.
We will look at Anglo and INBS in more detail in a later section 
but it is important to remember that the cost of the promissory 
notes and the cost of the recapitalisation are not the same thing. 
The repayments on the promissory notes include €17 billion of 
interest. This is being paid to Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, which 
are state owned. They in turn are using the promissory notes to 
avail of emergency liquidity from the Central Bank of Ireland. 
They are paying interest to the Central Bank for this facility. The 
Central Bank will make a profi t on this and will return the inter-
est to the Exchequer as part of its annual surplus. The interest on 
the promissory notes is not a cost to the State as much of it will 
be returned.
In 2011 there was a further stress test and subsequent recapital-
isation of the other four covered banks: AIB, Bank of Ireland, EBS 
and Permanent TSB. The Central Bank estimated that the four 
banks would need to be recapitalised by €24 billion in order to 
be in a position to absorb the losses projected over the next three 
years by the consulting fi rm BlackRock.
Signifi cant haircuts undertaken with subordinated bondhold-
ers in the banks provided about €5 billion of this amount. Some 
asset disposals by the banks and private sector investment in 
Bank of Ireland reduced the amount to be covered by the state to 
just under €17 billion. Of this, €10 billion came from the further 
liquidation of the assets built up in the National Pension Reserve 
Fund so the additional debt from the bank recapitalisation was 
around €7 billion.
The €119 billion increase in the GGD from 2007 to 2011 can be 
broken down as follows: 
• €13 billion to build up cash balances 
• €59 billion to fund government services 
• €47 billion for the bank bailout
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Although it attracts the most attention, the banking disaster has 
contributed just 40 per cent of the increase in the GGD over the 
past four years. The next issue is where the debt level is going to 
go over the next four years.
At this stage the only thing certain to increase the debt over 
the next four years are the annual defi cits. Some steps have been 
taken to try to control the defi cit but it remains at very high 
levels. Between 2012 and 2015 it is estimated that a further €40 
billion will be required to fi nance the annual defi cits across all 
areas of government. The defi cits for the four years are forecast 
to be €13.6 billion, €12.4 billion, €8.6 billion and €5.1 billion. This 
will put the debt at €206 billion in 2015.
This is substantially lower than some earlier estimates of our 
2015 debt. For example, in early 2011 the IMF were forecasting 
that the 2015 debt would be €225 billion and debt sustainabil-
ity was only possible if some very optimistic growth projections 
were used. However since then there have been some positive 
developments for Ireland’s debt dynamics.
The original EU/IMF programme set aside a €35 billion ‘worst 
case scenario’ contingency fund for the recapitalisation of the 
banks, of which €17.5 billion was going to be borrowed. As we 
now know the 2011 recapitalisation required less than €7 billion 
of additional borrowing. The reduction in the EU interest rates 
will reduce the forecast by around €3 billion while there was a €4 
billion reduction in the starting point because of a ‘double count-
ing error’ in the Department of Finance revealed in November 
2011. 
The IMF also used 2014 as an endpoint for the programme 
meaning their 2015 defi cit is on a no policy change basis. This put 
their original 2015 defi cit forecast about €3 billion higher than 
will be the case as the budgetary adjustment programme is now 
extended in 2015. 
In total, these developments over the past year mean that the 
IMF’s forecast of Ireland’s 2015 GGD can be reduced by more 
than €20 billion. After four years of almost unrelenting bad news 
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and deteriorating projections it is encouraging to see that some 
forecasts are fi nally beginning to improve.
Of course, all these defi cits, plus the rollover of existing debt 
will require substantial amounts of funding. Could it be the case 
that we will default because we will run out of money?
The current EU/IMF programme is designed to run until the 
end of 2013. Ireland needs €46 billion in 2012 and 2013 to fund the 
annual defi cits, meet the payments on the promissory notes and 
repay the maturing of existing debt. We still have to draw down 
around €34 billion of loans as part of the EU/IMF programme. 
The remaining €12 billion is expected to come from state savings 
schemes, our existing resources and some market funding.
Ireland had €13 billion of cash in the Exchequer account at the 
end of 2011. Without additional funding the state can meet all its 
obligations through to the end of 2013. It is also forecast that €1.5 
billion a year can be raised through the state savings schemes 
such as savings bonds, prize bonds and the national solidarity 
bond. In 2011 these raised €1.36 billion. If the €1.5 billion was 
achieved we would have around €4 billion left in the Exchequer 
account at the end of 2013. Without market funding this would 
be a very weak position to be in as there is a €12 billion bond 
maturing on 15 January 2014 and we will need €10 billion to fund 
the Exchequer defi cit that year.
We could run out of money in January 2014 but that will 
not happen. The National Treasury Management Agency has 
already carried a bond swap that has pushed the maturity of 
about one-third of the January 2014 bond out to February 2015. 
This reduced the amount of funding we will need in 2014. It is 
hoped that the state will ‘dip its toe’ back into the bond market in 
late 2012/early 2013 to try to raise some new market funding. At 
this remove it appears unlikely that this will be able to raise the 
necessary amounts. 
However, at the EU summit on 21 July 2011 it was agreed that 
programme countries would continue to be funded after the 
terms of the original agreements have ended. At the time, Michael 
Noonan said, ‘there’s a commitment that if countries continue to 
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fulfi l the conditions of their programme, the European authori-
ties will continue to supply them with money, even when the 
programme concludes’ and also ‘if we’re not back in the markets, 
the European authorities will give us money until we’re back in 
the markets.’ Ireland will not run out of money that will force it 
into a default.
There are other issues related to the banking collapse that 
are not included in the GGD. These are the fi nal outcome of the 
NAMA process, whether the shutdown of Anglo and INBS will 
require further injections of capital, and how to unwind the €110 
billion of liquidity the banks have taken from the European and 
Irish Central Banks. There is also the long-term hope that we will 
be able to sell off our stakes in the two ‘pillar’ banks to recoup 
some of the money swallowed by the bailout. There is a great 
deal of uncertainty about all these. 
The NAMA process has seen the creation of €31 billion of 
bonds used to buy over €72 billion of developer loans from the 
banks with an average discount of 58 per cent. These bonds are 
a liability of the state but following a ruling of Eurostat they 
are not included in the GGD. It is impossible to know what the 
fi nal outcome of the NAMA process will be. NAMA did create 
€31 billion of bonds to buy the developer debt, but it bought 
assets which also had a notional value of €31 billion as valued in 
November 2009. If these levels were to be maintained beyond the 
November 2009 valuation date, NAMA would have no effect on 
our net debt position. Of course, property prices have not been 
unchanged since November 2009 and in fact have tumbled ever 
downward. There are some estimates that the value of prop-
erty backing the loans has fallen by a further €5 billion since the 
NAMA valuation date. 
It is impossible to use this as a projection of possible NAMA 
losses. In most cases NAMA has control over the loans and not 
the assets. NAMA has been making substantial disposals for the 
past year but we are not told if the agency is making a loss or even 
possibly a profi t on these transactions. These sales have allowed 
NAMA to begin repaying the bonds issued when the agency was 
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formed. NAMA has the potential to make a call on the state’s 
resources to cover a shortfall in its operations. Of the €31 billion 
of bonds created, €1.5 billion are subordinated bonds which will 
not be repaid if the agency generates a loss. Unless there is an 
almost complete collapse in asset values it is hard to see how 
this shortfall could be more than €5 billion, and it is likely to be 
substantially less than that. 
The Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) was formed with 
the merger of Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish Nationwide Build-
ing Society in September 2011. The IBRC is a wholly state-owned 
bank and its liabilities are equivalent to sovereign liabilities. In 
its last set of accounts, produced for the fi rst six months of 2011 
Anglo revealed it has outstanding liabilities of €51 billion, of 
which €41 billion was owed to the Central Bank of Ireland. There 
was around €6 billion of bonds and €4 billion of other liabilities. 
A summary of Anglo’s last balance sheet is provided in Table 4.2. 
These liabilities could be included in the GGD and it is possible 
that a change to refl ect this will be introduced.
On the asset side we can see that half of these liabilities are 
already covered by promissory notes issued by the state and 
that there is €3 billion of equity in the bank. Consolidating the 
accounts would mean that about €20 billion of Anglo liabilities 
would be added to the GGD. The fi gure for the INBS part of the 
IBRC will be less than a quarter of this. 
This change would increase the debt ratio by 15 per cent of 
GDP and push the debt ratio above 130 per cent of GDP. It is 
important to realise that this change would not put any addi-
tional cost on the Exchequer but would merely allow the GGD to 
better refl ect the gross liabilities of the state.
Table 4.2: Anglo Irish Bank Balance Sheet, June 2011
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Promissory notes €24 billion Central Bank €41 billion
Customer loans €15 billion Bonds €6 billion
Loans for sale €7 billion Other liabilities €4 billion
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Other assets €8 billion
Total assets €54 billion Total liabilities €51 billion
Total equity €3 billion
Source: Anglo Irish Bank, Interim Report, June 2011
There will only be an additional cost to the state if the assets on 
the balance sheet are not able to meet the liabilities to be paid (of 
which 80 per cent is owed to the Central Bank of Ireland). The 
IBRC has already disposed of some of these. The loans for sale 
category includes a €6 billion US loan book which was sold for 
around €5 billion in October 2011. This loss was provided for in 
the above accounts. This €5 billion was used to repay some of the 
emergency liquidity assistance the bank is availing of from the 
Central Bank of Ireland.
Customer loans amount to €24 billion, with €15 billion in 
Ireland and €9 billion in the UK. All US loans were classed as 
loans for sale. A loss provision of €9 billion on customer loans 
gives rise to the €15 billion fi gure used in the balance sheet. This 
is a write-down of around 40 per cent. 
Figures on the loan book performance show that only 45 per 
cent of the loans are non-impaired. It is diffi cult to forecast what 
the recovery rate on non-performing loans will be but achieving 
60 per cent of the nominal value of the loans seems probable. The 
bank does have around €3 billion of equity (which was provided 
by the state of course) but this means that a loan loss rate of 
greater than 50 per cent would be required before any additional 
state resources would be required.
The inclusion of the IBRC would increase the GGD but would 
not mean that additional state support for the bank is necessar-
ily required. If no additional support to the bank is required the 
inclusion of the IBRC in the GGD cannot make debt sustainability 
any less likely. Only losses on the bank’s customer loans above 40 
per cent or on its other assets can cause that.
The €120 billion of Central Bank liquidity the banks have 
obtained is also backed by assets that have a nominal value well 
in excess of €120 billion. Outside of the IBRC, these are largely 
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the customer loans the banks have issued. Between the NAMA 
process and the recent stress tests, €85 billion of loan losses have 
been accounted for in the covered banks. Other losses provided 
for in the banks’ annual accounts (such as the €9 billion discussed 
in the Anglo accounts above) and covered by the former equity 
they held would bring this even higher. It is likely that well 
over €100 billion of loan losses in the banks have already been 
accounted for and there are no credible estimates that they will 
be higher.
The banks have substantial liabilities to central banks, bond-
holders and depositors. Without state assistance they would 
not be able to meet these liabilities. The state has provided €63 
billion to the banks to cover this shortfall. If the banks are not to 
meet their liabilities it would require losses above those already 
accounted for to materialise. There is little to suggest that this is 
the case. In time the covered banks can unwind their reliance on 
Central Bank funding. This will be achieved as loans are repaid 
or sold and by acquiring deposits, particular inter-bank deposits, 
as confi dence in the Irish banking system is slowly restored.
What all the above shows is why there is such confusion about 
Ireland’s public debt and why there is no hard rule on what 
constitutes an unsustainable level of debt. Ireland’s public debt is 
massive and is set to grow over the next few years. However, it 
is very probable that the debt ratio can be controlled and, in time, 
will fall away from the extreme levels it is currently exhibiting.
Using the current defi nition, Ireland’s GGD was €166 billion 
at the end of 2011. With nominal GDP of around €155 billion the 
debt was equivalent to 107 per cent of GDP. It is possible to get a 
number that is much larger than this.
If NAMA’s €30 billion of liabilities are included the debt would 
be 124 per cent of GDP. If the consolidated liabilities of the IBRC 
are added the debt would be around 140 per cent of GDP. If we 
are just picking numbers out of the air we could add another 10 
per cent of GDP for no good reason other than the banks have 
huge levels of Central Bank liquidity drawn down. As we’re at it 
we could add in over €100 billion of unfunded pension liabilities 
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that the state will face over the coming decades. In the space of a 
single paragraph we have gone from a high but manageable debt 
of 105 per cent of GDP to a huge and unsustainable debt of 220 
per cent of GDP. 
In fact, neither fi gure proves that the debt is manageable or 
unsustainable. What truly decides whether a debt mountain is 
sustainable or not is the interest burden it puts on the public 
fi nances. Japan can carry a debt of 220 per cent of GDP because 
it can borrow at less than 1 per cent interest over ten years. This 
keeps Japan’s interest expenditure at manageable levels. As coun-
tries rarely repay public debt the decisive issue is not the size of 
the debt but the amount of government revenue that goes to pay 
the interest on the debt.
State bodies such as NAMA and the IBRC, and even semi-
states like the Dublin Airport Authority and the ESB, have huge 
debt levels. However, because they have their own assets, the 
interest payments they make do not come out of general govern-
ment revenue. In fact, most of these bodies have suffi cient assets 
to allow them to not pay the interest but also to fully repay the 
debts they have accumulated. 
These debts could appear on the government’s balance sheet 
and give the impression that the state is going to be utterly over-
whelmed by debt. However, it is not the liabilities of these bodies 
that have to be covered by the state but the losses. And even then 
it is the interest burden that covering these losses would generate 
rather than the size of the losses that matters. If NAMA and the 
IBRC have €20 billion of losses to be covered by the state, then 
borrowing at 5 per cent would put an interest burden of €1 billion 
on the state. This is a huge sum of money but is not one that will 
result in national bankruptcy. There is no suggestion that these 
bodies will generate additional losses of more than small fraction 
of this amount.
While there is uncertainty about these losses, there is no uncer-
tainty about the ongoing need to fund the annual budget defi cit. 
Taking the end-2011 debt of €166 billion, and adding the €40 
billion needed for the defi cits, means that by the end of 2015 the 
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GGD will be in the region of €206 billion. This is the Department 
of Finance’s forecast, the European Commission’s forecast, will 
be the IMF’s forecast, and, for what it is worth, it is my forecast. 
Servicing the €206 billion debt mountain we have created will 
cost about €8 billion a year in cash interest payments. This is the 
total amount of cash interest the state will have to pay on its debt. 
Different aggregate debt levels can be obtained whether one 
includes or excludes a whole range of items. The cash interest to 
be paid is not open to such interpretation. There are huge govern-
ment debts in NAMA, the IBRC and other bodies but because 
they have their own resources the interest on these debts will not 
be a drain on the government’s resources.
A cash interest bill of €8 billion is a huge burden to carry. It 
will be about 4.5 per cent of GDP and most of this will be paid to 
external creditors. By 2015 general government revenue is fore-
cast to be around €62 billion with tax revenue of €43 billion. This 
cash interest will consume close to one-eighth of total govern-
ment revenue (or one-fi fth of tax revenue). The actual servicing 
cost will depend on the average interest rate, which is estimated 
to be 5.2 per cent. 
Of course if the 5.2 per cent was applied to the €206 billion debt 
then it suggests that the interest payments should be over €10 
billion. The €206 billion will include about €20 billion of promis-
sory notes and there will be nearly €2 billion of interest added to 
them in 2015. This interest is paid to the state-owned IBRC which 
in turn will be paying interest to the Central Bank of Ireland for 
emergency liquidity. The interest due on the promissory notes 
is not paid to the IBRC but is rolled up into the capital amount. 
The IBRC will receive a fi xed payment of €3.1 billion per year 
from the Exchequer until the promissory notes plus interest have 
been paid off. The presence of the promissory notes increases the 
government debt but does not affect the cash interest payments 
to be made.
An €8 billion annual interest payment is a huge burden for the 
country. However, at this stage, default remains an option to be 
considered rather than an inevitability to be endured. 
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We will also have substantial assets that would allow us to 
reduce the debt. In the above analysis we will also still have €13 
billion of cash reserves intact. If we exhaust our cash reserves 
the debt would be €193 billion, but such an action would not be 
prudent. Although much of the National Pension Reserve Fund 
has been liquidated to recapitalise the banks there is still around 
€5 billion remaining in the fund. The banks have also been 
provided with €3 billion of ‘contingent capital’ which is due to be 
returned to the Exchequer in 2014.
The debt will also be lower once, hopefully, a sale for the 
banks can be undertaken. We have complete ownership of AIB 
and Permanent TSB and a 15 per cent stake in Bank of Ireland. 
Although it seems unlikely at present there may yet come a time 
where we will be able to offl oad the banks and use the money 
generated to repay the debt. The amount raised will be nowhere 
near the €63 billion we have poured into the banks but it will 
usefully reduce the debt.
It is hard to put a value on the banks but it will be some non-
trivial sum. It is easy to suggest that the cash reserves, National 
Pension Reserve Fund and contingent capital would reduce 
Ireland’s net debt to GDP ratio to around 100 per cent. If 10 per 
cent of GDP could be obtained for the banks the net debt position 
would be 90 per cent of GDP. If you prefer GNP as the appropri-
ate measure of the Irish economy we are probably looking at a 
net debt in 2015 that will be around 115 per cent of GNP: large 
but by no means terminal.
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of Ireland’s €166 billion GGD 
at the end of December 2011. In November 2011 a Greek ‘default’ 
of 50 per cent on sovereign bonds held by private investors was 
agreed with the EU. There were many calls that Ireland should 
seek a similar write-down on its debt. As the table shows, Ireland 
has €85 billion of outstanding sovereign bonds with another €5 
billion to be repaid in March 2012.
The covered banks have around €12 billion of Irish govern-
ment bonds on their balance sheet. Any write-downs here will 
have to be made good by capital injections from the state so the 
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net benefi t of a default on these bonds would be reduced by the 
money we would have to put into the banks. The ECB holds an 
estimated €22 billion of Irish government bonds as a result of the 
bond buying programme that it has been undertaking since the 
middle of 2011. The ECB has declared itself not to be a private 
creditor. This means the 50 per cent write-down would apply to 
about €50 billion of government bonds which would generate a 
total debt reduction of around €25 billion. If the Greek default 
was applied to Irish debt it would reduce the debt total by 15 per 
cent and bring it down to 90 per cent of GDP. The ongoing defi cit 
and the likely increased interest cost of the remaining debt would 
quickly see it rise back above 100 per cent of GDP.
As was pointed out above it is not necessarily the size of the 
debt that matters but the interest burden it places on the govern-
ment. If a 50 per cent haircut was applied to privately held Irish 
government bonds it would reduce our interest bill by €1.25 
billion per annum, assuming that the average rate on the debt 
written off was 5 per cent. It is forecast that the general govern-
ment defi cit for 2012 will be €13.6 billion. It would still be above 
€12 billion if the 50 per cent debt write-down was applied. Even 
an 80 per cent write-down would only knock €2 billion off the 
annual interest bill.
It should also be noted that this is only on the assumption that 
the interest rate on our remaining debt remains unchanged. It 
would take an increase of only 1 percentage point on the remain-
ing €124 billion of debt to fully offset the interest savings from the 
initial write-down. It is highly probable that such a rise would 
occur.
Any Irish default would have to focus on sovereign bonds 
but these are not held in suffi cient quantity by private inves-
tors to generate suffi cient benefi ts to offset the undoubted costs 
that would follow such an action. A default worthy of the name 
would require losses to be forced on offi cial creditors. Much as it 
might seem desirable or attractive, it is not possible to unilater-
ally default on the ECB, EU or the IMF.
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By going through the debt numbers, we see that we brought 
€47 billion of debt with us into this crisis in 2008. Bailing out the 
banks will have generated around €47 billion of debt by 2015. The 
annual Budget defi cits between 2008 and 2015 will have gener-
ated €99 billion of borrowings and we have borrowed €13 billion 
to build up a cash buffer. 
If the country had avoided assuming the bad debt losses of 
the banking sector, the debt ratio in 2015 would still around 90 
per cent of GDP, which is better than 115 per cent but would not 
eliminate the fear of default because of the ongoing annual defi -
cits. Of course, without the bank bailout we would also have a 
€20 billion sovereign wealth fund. 
A negative outcome on any of the unknowns listed above will 
increase the fear of default, but just because there is a lot of noise 
suggesting default is inevitable is not enough to mean it will 
happen. If the necessary steps are taken we can carry the interest 
burden of a debt of 115 per cent from 2015 and, in time, the debt 
ratio will fall. It will be painful but it can be done. 
We don’t need to default on our debt but we may need some 
further assistance from the EU/IMF. To get through the end 
of 2015 the government needs to borrow €40 billion to fund its 
expenditure. The government also needs around €36 billion to 
roll over existing debt and pay the promissory notes. We need 
close to €76 billion of funding to see us from 2012 through to the 
end of 2015.
The EU/IMF deal will provide €34 billion of this. We need to 
raise an additional €42 billion, or around €30 billion if we use up 
our cash reserves. The offi cial view is that we will return to the 
bond markets in late 2013 and begin raising this money then. With 
current yields on Irish bonds in the secondary market above 7 per 
cent it is still hard to see how we can raise this money sustainably 
from private sources. Market sentiment may improve as uncer-
tainty about our situation dissipates, which would allow us to 
raise the money, but if that does not happen soon enough we will 
need additional support from the EU/IMF. We could achieve 
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the funding target but if not I believe that this support will be 
provided because the programme can work.
If the option to default is to be taken, or default occurs because 
we have not arranged to have the required funding in place, those 
to suffer will be holders of Irish government bonds. It is more 
than a little incongruous that senior bondholders who invested 
in our delinquent banks are getting their money back while those 
who invested in our country may be forced to carry losses. As 
with a lot of things in this crisis, including unsupported claims of 
a €250 billion public debt, this just does not add up. I believe we 
can avoid that outcome and that we can stabilise our public debt. 
So this is my default story.
WID-04.indd   18 14/02/2012   15:25:24
